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Over the past decade, the supply of both new schools and redesigned district 
schools has mushroomed. Propelled by forces ranging from charter-school, state, 
and federal accountability legislation, to strong demand from parents and students, 
to mounting public opinion pressing for reform, educators and education 
entrepreneurs have poured their energies into developing innovative solutions to 
improve America’s schools.  
Despite the growing momentum, however, there are not yet nearly enough good 
schools to go around; nor does the capacity exist to turn around all the schools 
that are currently failing. Many educators remain skeptical of the staying power of 
current reform initiatives. The news media continue to be filled with reports about 
schools that are not living up to their promise—many high-profile success stories 
notwithstanding. 
The fact that so many of the successful new and redesigned schools have been 
one-off, isolated experiments magnifies the confusion. Everyone knows that certain 
schools work: but exactly what is working or how the success of one school can be 
replicated in other contexts is much less clear.  
The NewSchools Venture Fund, the Bridgespan Group, and the Bill & Melinda 
Gates Foundation have been working with a wide range of school development 
organizations across the country to increase the number of high-performing 
schools. In the process, we have identified two levers that appear to play a 
critically important role in determining how quickly and consistently successful 
schools and design models can be replicated. One is the degree of managerial 
responsibility, support, and control the organization chooses to exercise. The other 
is the specificity of its school design. The choices an organization’s leadership 
makes about each of these levers will affect how quickly its model can be 
replicated, the human and financial capital it will require, and the likelihood of 
achieving consistent high-quality outcomes.  
In general, the greater the degree of management support and design specificity a 
school development organization provides, the better the odds are that it will be 
able to replicate high-quality results in new locations. At the same time, such 
models are likely to grow slowly and, in many cases, their cost structures are 
unlikely to be replicable at a broad systems level. In contrast, models that are more 
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loosely managed and leave more room to others for interpretation can be 
replicated quickly, but the odds that the quality of the results will suffer are also 
higher.  
Given the urgent need for more high-quality schools, there is room for many 
approaches to increasing the supply of new and redesigned schools. By the same 
token, however, it is crucial that school development organizations understand the 
tradeoffs that are inherent in each approach, so that the decisions they make 
about management responsibility and design specificity will be aligned with the 
impact they are trying to achieve as well as with their replication strategy.   
Mapping the School Development Landscape  
The universe of school developers is highly diverse.1 For the past 30 years, many 
talented educators, leaders, and funders have taken up the call to fix America’s 
schools, bringing with them a variety of creative and often research-based 
solutions. Early on, many of these efforts focused on pieces of the problem: 
offering rigorous academic enrichment to remedial students, for example; or 
expanding college preparatory course offerings; or providing students with caring 
adult mentors. But while many of these programs achieved good results, more 
often than not the results occurred in some contexts for some students.  
Consequently, researchers have increasingly concluded that if lasting change is to 
occur for all children, particularly the most disadvantaged, the entire system will 
have to change, with effective schools becoming the norm in every district without 
the cost—and delay—of creating new models each and every time.   
New American Schools, the privately funded, nonprofit corporation established in 
1991 in conjunction with President Bush’s America 2000 Initiative, was one of the 
pioneers in taking a comprehensive approach to reforming schools and, in some 
                                                   
1 As used in this paper, the term “school developer” refers to third-party organizations involved in 
the transformation and/or creation of public schools. 
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cases, school districts. NAS was guided by the principle that all high-quality 
schools possess a unifying design that provides a consistent and coherent 
instructional program to all students and allows all staff to work to the best of their 
abilities. As NAS and others have learned, however, conducting effective whole-
school reform is vastly more complicated than designing a targeted program. All 
the components of the school—from its curriculum to its governance structure—are 
in play. Developing an integrated model that will work in multiple contexts is an 
even more daunting task. Nevertheless, growing numbers of school reform 
organizations have taken up the challenge.   
Broadly speaking, these organizations approach their work in one of two ways: by 
consulting to new or existing schools or school and district leaders; or by operating 
new or redesigned schools themselves. Developers in the first group (technical 
assistance, or TA, providers) provide training, a research-based model for the 
design of the school, and coaching to the schools and leaders in their networks, 
but they neither “own” nor operate schools themselves. Those in the second group 
(school managers) represent a more recent addition to the ranks of school 
reformers. These organizations create, manage, and sometimes own new start-up 
schools, either within a district or outside of it. Unlike TA providers, which can 
expand the number of schools with which they work by adding part-time or 
consulting staff, school managers grow by replicating entire schools with their 
supporting infrastructure.  
THE SPECTRUM OF MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITY, SUPPORT, 
AND CONTROL 
Based on this fundamental difference in approach, developers can be arrayed 
along a spectrum of management responsibility, support, and control, running from 
loose to tight. TA providers tend to be clustered at the left end of the spectrum, in 
the voluntary association camp, organizing the schools in their networks in loose 
federations, with little operational oversight. School managers, on the other hand, 
tend to fall at the right end of the spectrum, operating the facilities, hiring and 
managing the staff, and even holding the schools’ charters or performance 
contracts.  
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Between these two extremes is a third group of developers that employ a variety of 
forms, ranging from informal, quality-assurance mechanisms to formal “franchise 
agreements” and standards, to engage with the schools in their networks. 
Developers that fall into this intermediate realm, which we call deep engagement, 
can be structured either as partial managers or as deep TA providers. (Exhibit 1 
illustrates this spectrum.) 
Exhibit 1: Spectrum of management responsibility, support, and control 
 
 
 
 
A variety of factors influence where along the spectrum school developers choose 
to locate themselves, including their impact goals and program model, their 
organizational capabilities and culture, and the scale and complexity of their 
operations. Ensuring quality as new schools open depends not only on having a 
firm grasp of the model’s critical elements, but also on having access to the 
requisite people and funding. Consequently, the choices school developers make 
may also be a function of funders’ interests at a given time. At present, for 
example, significantly more public sources are available to fund consulting and 
coaching models than exist to cover the capital and scaling costs of starting 
systems of new schools. 
THE SPECTRUM OF DESIGN SPECIFICITY 
School-development organizations can be further mapped along a second 
dimension: the specificity of their school design. This dimension reflects the degree 
to which a particular developer’s model is codified and standardized, with options 
falling along a loose-tight spectrum from broad design principles to a fully specified 
design. (Exhibit 2 illustrates this spectrum.)   
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Exhibit 2: Spectrum of design specificity 
 
 
 
 
 
Once again, the degree of specificity a given school developer chooses is likely to 
be influenced by a number of considerations, including its leadership’s values and 
beliefs about the nature of schooling and teaching and what will motivate others to 
become involved in their efforts. For example, some school developers believe that 
each new school has to be customized and co-created with the local community at 
the grass-roots level; while others believe, equally strongly, that research-based 
models can work in many contexts as long as they are adjusted to accommodate 
local cultural and community needs and desires. 
When these two organizational levers are arrayed along the x- and y-axes of a 
matrix, the result is a grid with six cells which we have named on the basis of the 
prototypical organizations that occupy them.  Although many school developers will 
move about within this grid during their organizational lifetimes, most can be 
located in one or another of these cells. We recognize that these names may 
change as the field evolves over time; what is important is not the name of a 
particular category per se, but rather what it implies for a school developer’s ability 
to grow and maintain the quality of its results over time. (Exhibit 3 illustrates this 
matrix. The Appendix contains a definition of each category accompanied by an 
example.)   
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Exhibit 3: Mapping the school development landscape 
Managing the Levers of Growth 
The degree of management responsibility a school developer exercises and the 
specificity of its school design have implications for its growth trajectory.  
Organizations that maintain a high degree of management responsibility generally 
grow more slowly than those that give affiliates more autonomy. For that very 
reason, however, the latter also may have more difficulty achieving consistent 
results, especially over time. Similarly, a highly flexible school design can enable 
faster growth, but it is also subject to less consistency, especially if the founding 
leaders or teams move on. In contrast, more highly specified designs can have 
mixed effects: the existence of a prescribed model that others are able to replicate 
can speed up growth; but the need to monitor the fidelity of its implementation may 
slow the pace down or drive the cost up. Whatever the consequences, however, 
greater design specificity is likely to increase the consistency of the results.  
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Finding the right level of managerial responsibility and design specificity is a 
balancing act, which depends not only on the school developer’s skills, 
capabilities, assets, and relationships, but also on the site-level leaders and 
community in which reform is occurring. (Oakland, Chicago, Los Angeles, and New 
York are all urban school districts, for example, but each city’s political context is 
quite different.) It is also a learning process, which often leads to different 
decisions as an organization ages or grows. 
For example, school developers that start out overseeing new sites quite loosely 
may decide to tighten the reins as they add more sites in order to maintain 
consistent results. The National Council of La Raza (NCLR) began its Charter 
School Development Initiative (CSDI) in 2000 in response to significant demand 
from community-based affiliates and persistent failures on the part of the public 
schools to close the education gap between Hispanics and other groups. CSDI 
provided a range of training programs and technical assistance to its initial 
grantees, but it did not require them to adopt a specific school design. Now, with 
achievement of its initial goal of 50 affiliate-based schools in sight, NCLR is shifting 
toward a tighter design model and a deeper level of management support, 
including performance evaluations of CSDI mid-managers linked directly to 
improvements in student achievement. Alternatively, if developers that have 
successfully created small numbers of high-performing schools want to increase 
the pace at which they can provide better outcomes for more kids, they will have to 
identify—and focus on—the handful of elements in their school-design and 
management models that are most critical to achieving results.   
To illustrate how the organizational levers of responsibility and design can be used 
to promote more consistent, higher-quality replication, consider three examples. 
BAYCES: FROM ASSOCIATION TO PARTNER 
The Bay Area Coalition of Equitable Schools (BayCES) was founded in 1991 to 
create and sustain networks of high-achieving and equitable small schools. 
Working with the educational principles promulgated by Brown University professor 
Ted Sizer in his book Horace’s Compromise, but with increased focus on the issue 
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of equity, BayCES originally was located in the association (or lower left) corner of 
the matrix. Its leaders were strong believers in the value of local ownership and felt 
that each community had to adapt its school design to meet the needs of its own 
constituency of students, teachers, parents, and neighborhoods and, ultimately, 
help schools achieve high and equitable outcomes for all of their students. As a 
result, BayCES focused on developing a customized design at each site through a 
collaborative process of listening, playing back what they heard, mobilizing the 
school community toward short-term, achievable goals, and learning from the 
results. Persuaded that reforms could be sustained by changing the norms and 
expectations of communities and classroom teachers, BayCES’s leadership did not 
attempt to exercise management control at the school or district level. The only 
absolutes were its guiding principles, which were broadly directional rather than 
prescriptive (for example, “teaching and learning should be personalized to the 
maximum feasible extent,” and “the school should demonstrate non-discriminatory 
and inclusive policies, practices, and pedagogies”).  
As BayCES evolved, however, its leadership increasingly realized that the district 
bureaucracy was itself a major impediment to classroom-level change. It therefore 
chose to work with the leaders of its focus districts to create a policy environment 
conducive to its work at the school level (for example, creating a new policy in the 
Oakland Unified School District to promote and support the development of small 
schools). To gain the requisite degree of control, BayCES took an unusual and 
powerful approach: rather than try to operate the schools, which officially reported 
to the district, BayCES developed reciprocal relationships with grassroots groups 
like the Oakland Community Organization to mobilize thousands of parent-activists 
to interrupt “business as usual” at the district and to protect BayCES’s work—and 
its benefits to their children. This overwhelming community support (together with 
its credible, professional staff of former teachers, research-based approach, 
understanding of Oakland politics, and flexible funding) gave BayCES a degree of 
influence over the district that moved it significantly along the axis of management 
responsibility, support, and control. 
Today BayCES is a deeply-engaged partner, playing an integral role at the school, 
district, and community levels: supporting new small schools, building district 
capacity and ensuring supportive policies, and mobilizing sustained community 
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demand for better schools. The tradeoff BayCES has had to make is in the pace of 
growth. Under its earlier coaching model, BayCES was able to grow rapidly and 
flexibly by extending its services to schools throughout the Northern California 
region. The only major impediment to its growth was the availability of skilled 
coaching staff—a major constraint, but not as binding as having to be able to work 
at the district, school, and community level. Now, because so much of its ability to 
achieve impact depends on its deep local knowledge, district relationships, and 
active political constituency, as well as the availability of skilled coaching staff, 
BayCES cannot replicate its model easily in new locations.  
BayCES anticipates that the process of building a lasting local coalition could take 
many years and that its impact will require work at multiple levels: the community, 
the school, and the district. The work in the community, in fact, is what will hold 
schools and districts accountable—a key way in which BayCES exerts 
management control. Looking ahead, BayCES plans to grow by deepening its 
work with its current partners in Oakland, Emeryville, and Berkeley and truly 
transforming those districts and communities into places where the community 
demands and expects high quality education for all of its students.    
KIPP: FROM FRANCHISE TO MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION  
KIPP, which stands for the Knowledge is Power Program, got its start in 1994 when 
Mike Feinberg and Dave Levin, two Teach for America graduates, launched a 
program for 5th graders at Garcia Elementary, an inner-city Houston public school. 
On the basis of their students’ accelerated results, the program quickly evolved 
into one of Houston’s first charter schools and expanded to New York, with the 
opening of the KIPP Academy in the South Bronx in 1995. As word of the schools’ 
success spread (especially after a 60 Minutes profile in 1999), requests to replicate 
the program multiplied; and in 2000, Feinberg and Levin partnered with Gap, Inc. 
founders Doris and Don Fisher to create the KIPP Foundation to support the 
school model’s replication in new sites. 
Rather than try to stipulate every aspect of a school’s design, the Foundation 
focused on the element it believed was paramount: the school’s culture. Culture 
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was defined through a set of values, norms, and practices, which were spelled out 
in the “five pillars” of the KIPP model. For example, every KIPP school has to have 
high, clearly-defined, measurable expectations for its students’ academic 
performance and conduct. Norms such as parent and student contracts supported 
this culture of achievement, which was reinforced by a range of formal and 
informal rewards and consequences as well as a “no-excuses” mindset. 
The KIPP Foundation was similarly judicious about emphasizing a small number of 
essential management levers, of which leadership was by far the most important. 
KIPP uses a rigorous selection process to identify prospective school leaders who 
are both high achievers themselves and committed to improving the educational 
achievements of their students. The Foundation then hones these qualities and 
ensures the consistency of its vision and values through a year-long leadership 
program, which includes a six-week program on instructional, operational, and 
organizational leadership, a two-month residency in existing KIPP schools, and six 
months of school start-up work, supported by KIPP Foundation teams. In addition, 
the KIPP schools’ charters are generally held by a local KIPP school governing 
board, which is accountable for its performance and compliance with local charter 
laws as well as local community support.  
Adopting this “franchise” model, which controls certain elements of replication (the 
culture of KIPP schools is so strong that you know you are in one when you walk in 
the door) and requires local partners to fundraise part of each school’s ongoing 
costs, allowed KIPP to grow from two schools to 38 schools between 1999 and 
2004. At the same time, best practices, which could be codified and replicated, 
were beginning to emerge, opening the door to the possibility that other sites 
would not have to reinvent the wheel. In addition, while most schools were posting 
impressive gains, KIPP’s leadership recognized that too much variability in 
outcomes would compromise the strength of the organization’s emerging brand 
and therefore its ability to achieve its mission of changing the country’s 
expectations and proving that “all children can and will learn.”   
To meet the challenges of growth, therefore, KIPP has further defined its school 
approach and bolstered its level of support for school leaders. For instance, KIPP 
has begun to codify and promote instructional and organizational tools that have 
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proved effective in one or more KIPP schools, such as the KIPP math curriculum. 
Although the curriculum is not prescribed, every new KIPP leader receives 
information about it, and a substantial number of schools now use the approach.  
Similarly, while KIPP’s strong commitment to the autonomy of its school leaders 
precludes it from truly owning affiliated schools, the Foundation has begun to 
deepen its support and engagement with them in several ways: bolstering local 
and national central office support for key functions such as real estate, knowledge 
management, and research and evaluation; collecting and disseminating content 
to KIPP school leaders; and using the leadership development process to help 
recruit KIPP teachers.  
ASPIRE PUBLIC SCHOOLS: CREATING A CHARTER MANAGEMENT 
ORGANIZATION 
In 1992, the San Carlos school district authorized California’s first charter school, 
the San Carlos Charter Learning Center. Don Shalvey, the district’s superintendent 
at the time, was a lifelong educator and school leader who had seen at first hand 
(in his own district and across the state) public education’s failures to serve many 
students, especially those in low-income areas. Shalvey believed that charter 
schools could be a catalyst for promoting district-wide change by providing a 
supply of high-quality new schools, introducing competition into public education, 
and demonstrating what could be accomplished by giving schools flexibility in 
exchange for accountability. 
Working with other state leaders, Shalvey succeeded in getting California to raise 
the cap on the number of charter schools it would allow. In 1998, realizing that an 
aligned system of schools could have even more leverage on districts, he started 
Aspire Public Schools, and in 1999 opened two new schools in Stockton and 
Modesto. The schools’ core elements included: a high-needs student population; 
small school size; a longer school day and year; high expectations for students and 
staff; and rigorous coursework.  
Since Aspire was the first nonprofit charter management organization, many of the 
design choices that Shalvey and his team made are instructive for other 
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organizations that want to scale up their operations and impact. Chief among them 
is their decision to centralize management responsibility, support, and control. 
Because Shalvey sought deep, dramatic change in the California school system 
and wanted to demonstrate the power of Aspire’s model at scale, the team chose a 
tight management model and a tight school design that is consistent across all 
sites. They also decided to cluster the schools geographically, locating all of them 
in a handful of northern California communities that are within a few hours’ drive of 
each other. Clustering enables the Aspire team to provide the kind of hands-on 
support and guidance each school needs as it grows to scale and adapts the basic 
Aspire educational model to the needs of its student population and community. It 
also makes it possible for the schools to share resources with each other and 
allows the Aspire brand to spread more quickly by word of mouth.  
Today Aspire serves nearly 4,000 students with 11 K-12 schools clustered in the 
Stockton, Modesto, Oakland, and East Palo Alto communities. It also plans to 
expand to both Los Angeles and Sacramento—areas with a high degree of need 
and a potential fit with Aspire’s model. 
It is important to note that Shalvey chose to structure Aspire as a nonprofit so that 
student outcomes would take priority over potential profits. This choice was also 
crucial to Aspire’s theory of change, which aims to develop a coherent, aligned 
system of high-quality schools that can serve as a model for districts and, as such, 
shares its lessons learned along the way. In their quest for market share and return 
on investment, for-profit education management organizations tend to be less 
open to such shared communication.  
Looking Forward 
In light of the continuing evolution of the school-development movement, this 
paper is far more likely to be a snapshot in time than an official history. 
Nevertheless, after working with many school development organizations, we 
believe one set of findings is unlikely to change: effective schools can be harder, or 
easier, to replicate with quality, consistency, and speed, depending on the 
developer’s degree of management responsibility and the specificity of its design. 
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Tighter management responsibility, support, and control or a more specific model 
will increase the consistency of the organization’s outcomes. Tightening both 
management control and the school model is likely to increase the consistency of a 
new school’s results even more, given the complexity of school models and 
management. But it is likely to increase the cost of replication as well. 
School developers do not need to own and manage their schools, nor do the 
schools necessarily need to be charter schools, in order to achieve a sufficient 
measure of management accountability. Management responsibility, support, and 
control can be strengthened in a variety of ways: through relationships and the 
leverage the school-development organization provides to a district through its staff 
and resources; through community engagement; and/or with formal contracts and 
accountability systems. Similarly, school designs need not be spelled out in every 
detail in order to be specific enough to ensure consistency. Rather, school 
developers need to identify the core elements of their models that make them 
effective and ensure that those elements are replicated faithfully.   
Given the many external obstacles to true school reform, building an adequate 
supply of high-quality public schools will require the active participation of school 
developers of all kinds, from school management organizations whose new 
schools offer models for redesigning districts to TA providers that can supply 
coaching and proven school designs to struggling schools. For their part, 
educators committed to raising the performance of their districts—whether by 
developing entirely new schools, augmenting existing capacity, or both—should 
seek out and work with proven operators.    
The need to learn as much as possible, as quickly as possible, about how to scale 
effective schools is indisputable. According to “Who Graduates? Who Doesn’t?” a 
study published by the Urban Institute, the dropout rate for the class of 2001 in 
high schools across the country was 32 percent, with some cities and rural areas 
having dropout rates of more than 60 percent. Many high school seniors lack basic 
reading and mathematics skills. The majority of high school graduates are not 
academically prepared for college. The gulf between students of different races is 
growing: African-American and Latino 12th graders have math and reading skills 
that are at the same level as those of white 8th graders.  
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These results are shameful and, increasingly, unacceptable. After years of growing 
momentum, the political will to transform public education is now remarkably 
strong on both sides of the aisle. Many school developers also believe that they 
are positioned to help achieve the kind of breakthroughs that will make such poor 
educational outcomes obsolete. The framework presented in this paper is 
designed to inform the choices these developers will face as they try to replicate 
models that have been successful on a smaller scale. As such, we hope that it will 
help them and their supporters make the most of this window of opportunity to give 
all American students the education they deserve.   
Appendix: Populating the Matrix 
Associations 
An association is a voluntary alliance of schools and/or leaders that agree to follow 
a set of design principles for educating students and organizing the school. 
Associations typically share best practices through publications and conferences 
that bring together and educate the members of the alliance community.  
Example: Education has been a central priority for the National Council of La Raza 
(NCLR)—the largest national Hispanic civil rights and advocacy organization in the 
United States focused on “reducing poverty and discrimination and increasing life 
opportunity” for Latinos—since its inception in 1968. In 2000, NCLR established a 
Charter School Development Initiative (CSDI) in response to both the public school 
system’s continuing failure to close education-achievement gaps between 
Hispanics and other groups, and significant demand from its community-based 
affiliates, many of whom were operating alternative and contract schools and/or 
providing early-education, after-school, and English-as-a-Second-Language 
programs. CSDI’s mandate was to provide planning, re-opening, implementation, 
and follow-up grants to new and emerging charter schools, along with training and 
technical support for their leaders and sponsors. Technical support was provided 
primarily through Professional Development Institutes, multi-day training 
workshops which were open to all NCLR affiliates including non-grantees. 
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In 2004, with its initial goal of 50 affiliate-based schools in sight, NCLR began a 
deliberate, purposeful shift toward a “tighter” school design model with greater 
capacity to support on-site coaching and instruction, a deepening focus on 
assessment and accountability, and a new training protocol requiring greater 
monitoring, on-sire observation, and follow-up after training workshops and 
institutes, consistent with best practice in the field.      
Design Teams 
Design teams are more structured in their approach to school design than 
associations.  
Example: America’s Choice, part of the New American Schools design competition, 
housed at the National Center on Education and the Economy, offers its affiliated 
schools a highly prescriptive school design, which includes standards-based 
curriculum materials, policies, and tools that aim to enable all students to do 
college-level work by the time they reach 10th grade. Investments to research the 
design, benchmark it against educational systems in other countries, and refine it 
amounted to some $80 million. Schools that join the network (more than 500 in 15 
states since it began in 1998) cannot change the design, although teachers who 
have received formal training are given some discretion in implementation. 
America’s Choice has developed a detailed protocol for assessing the extent of the 
design’s implementation and schools’ need for focused attention and feedback. It 
is also rigorous in training its coaches and certifying teachers to train other 
teachers, so that the design is consistent across schools. 
Partners 
Partners create networks of schools and other organizations, organized around a 
set of principles. Partner schools receive training, resources, and technical 
assistance to redesign existing schools or to set up new ones. Partners typically 
have strong quality assurance mechanisms, and potential schools go through a 
vetting process to become part of the network. Partners may also collaborate with 
the schools to identify new leadership and other interventions if schools are not 
performing. 
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Example: Urban Assembly in New York City works with teachers and community -
based organizations to develop theme-based schools (such as media; sports; and 
law, government, and justice) that will engage students and connect each school to 
a network of partners in the public, private, and nonprofit sectors. The school’s 
theme is incorporated into all aspects of the academic experience, including the 
core curriculum, field trips, internships, and mentoring programs. Since its founding 
in 1997, Urban Assembly, in partnership with the NYC Department of Education 
and New Visions for Public Schools, has opened nine new, small, public high 
schools. 
Franchises 
Franchisers license their brand to other organizations that agree to follow their 
specific program design and meet their standards. Because they have explicit 
agreements with the schools in their networks (in some cases, holding the schools’ 
charters), they have much more control over individual schools than partners do. 
Also, although it is not easy to do, franchisers can dissociate themselves from local 
schools that do not meet their standards, which can help ensure quality if the 
franchise truly offers valuable services and brand association.  
Example: EdVisions operates a network of 16 schools in Minnesota and 
Wisconsin. EdVisions requires its schools to adhere to a 14-point checklist of non-
negotiable school design attributes, including the use of projects, rather than 
classes or courses, to meet state standards, and commitment to creating a 
“Teacher Professional Practice,” in which teachers take control of and 
responsibility for staffing and compensation, academic programs, teacher quality, 
and other key decisions. It recruits, trains, and provides technical assistance to 
school design teams who, in turn, open and operate schools in their communities. 
EdVisions provides grant funding over a three-year period and requires rigorous 
school assessment plans, which it uses as levers of control to ensure that schools 
meet its accountability standards. 
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Portfolio Managers 
Portfolio managers wholly own and operate schools, but individual schools within 
the network can follow different school designs. All are strongly “branded” so that 
parents and teachers know what to expect. The portfolio management organization 
performs much of the back-office work for its schools, typically including finding 
and opening new facilities, often pursuing and holding charters and raising funds, 
and sometimes hiring and firing principals and teachers. In some ways, a portfolio 
manager is like a “virtual school district,” with a number of different educational 
“brands” within its system.  
Example: The Chicago Charter School Foundation, founded in 1997, operates 
seven multi-site campuses (with the potential to add more as opportunities arise), 
under the terms of its charter with the Chicago Board of Education. Rather than 
create these schools from the ground up, CCSF contracts with school-
management organizations with diverse school designs to run the schools it owns. 
While each school adheres to a general set of principles of collaboration, 
innovation, and healthy competition, CCSF offers parents a choice of schools—
and, within those schools, programs and designs (including such well-known 
brands as Success for All, Saxon Math, and Junior Great Books).  
Education Management Organizations (EMOs) and Charter 
Management Organizations (CMOs) 
These school developers wholly own and operate schools, either as for-profit 
businesses (EMOs) or as nonprofits (CMOs), according to a specified school 
design. They tend to be branded in much the same way that a business is (so that 
the brand tells school leaders, teachers, parents, and students what they can 
expect in terms of the school’s values, curriculum, and approach); and they strive 
for alignment along every dimension from mission and governance to curriculum, 
human resources, and evaluation. EMOs tend to be national in scope and to open 
the entire school at one time. Because of their for-profit orientation they are 
strongly focused on managing costs and achieving scale quickly. CMOs tend to be 
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locally or regionally focused and often open their schools one grade at a time. In 
part due to capital constraints, they tend to grow slowly at first.   
Examples: Founded in 1992, Edison Schools, Inc. now serves more than 250,000 
public school students in more than 20 states across the U.S. and in the U.K. The 
earliest (and still the best known) of the EMOs, Edison establishes whole-school 
management partnerships with districts and charter schools, summer, after-school, 
and SES programs, and provides achievement management solutions for school 
systems. Aspire Public Schools is a CMO that started in 1998 and now includes 11 
schools in the San Francisco Bay Area. Aspire builds highly personalized, high-
quality, small schools that emphasize high standards and clear learning goals for 
every student; and it oversees every aspect of the schools’ day-to-day operations.   
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